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INTRODUCTION 
 In today’s American housing market, foreclosure can be seen as an epidemic 
resulting from the legal mass marketing of risky loan products and systematic overcharging 
of consumers in susceptible positions. Subprime mortgages are high-cost home loans 
intended for people with weak or blemished credit histories, and though they are intended 
to encourage and facilitate homeownership, not only did politicians create a flawed 
mortgage industry to push for this “American Dream” but it is arguably a manipulative 
industry that can easily be taken advantage of.1 Thus, current snapshots of the subprime 
market show that one in every five subprime mortgages made in 2005-2006 will end in 
foreclosure.2 Many institutions have targeted mortgage lending reform as the most critical 
step in mending the United States’ economy; that is, confidence may be restored in the 
housing market by either strengthening existing mortgage lending practices – including 
correcting business incentives to make “bad loans” – or developing more innovative 
policies to do so. And while over two million homeowners have already been affected, the 
consequences have had massive spillover effects including property value reductions, lost 
jobs, and devastated communities. 
 Nearly every state has seen significant increases in mortgage foreclosures (47 states 
and Washington, D.C. experienced a 20 per cent increase in the number of mortgage loans 
facing foreclosure since December 20063) and though this has clearly been a national crisis, 
                                                      
1 Albrechtsen, Janet. "Not Everyone Should Own a Home," The Wall Street Journal 06 Oct 2008. 
Web.16 Apr 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122325772150706655.html>. 
2 "A Snapshot of the Subprime Market." Mortgage Lending. 28 Nov 2007. Center for Responsible 
Lending. 16 Apr 2009 <http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/snapshot-of-the-subprime-market.pdf>. 
3 Urahn, Sue and Shelley Hearne. "Defaulting on the Dream: States Respond to America's Foreclosure 
Crisis." The Pew Charitable Trusts Apr 2008 Web.05 Apr 2009. 
<http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Subprime_mortgages/defaulting_o
n_the_dream.pdf>. 
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even overflowing into international economies, it is debatably the state and local 
governments which will carry a larger portion of the foreclosure burden. As public policy 
typically shows, municipalities that are geographically closer to its citizens will experience 
greater demands for control and regulation, as well as for services to deal directly with the 
policy problem. In this case, this includes managing vacant and abandoned properties, the 
financially-struggling homeowners, and consumers seeking safer mortgage loans and 
practices. Likewise, the state, local governments, and taxpayers experience fiscal pain. 
Thus, more than federal law, it is important to focus on the efforts of individual states in 
this foreclosure tide.  
 Trends have shown that states hit hardest by the crisis have already responded 
assertively to mitigate the damage done to homeowners, lenders and their own 
municipalities and budgets.4 Because the states are limited in their legislative decisions 
next to federal law, many have utilized such Congressional bills as “The Mortgage Reform 
and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007” (H.R. 3915) and the Homeownership and Equity 
Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), as well as North Carolina’s Predatory Lending Laws 
(Senate Bill 1149), enacted ten years ago in 1999, as paradigms for new mortgage lending 
solutions. Consequently, many of these responses require government leadership and 
funding. According to the Pew Center for the States, the states have explored three key 
areas for reform: (1) helping borrowers avoid foreclosure and stay in their homes; (2) 
                                                      
4 Rivlin, Alice M.. "State and Federal Policy in the Foreclosure Crisis: Notes for Luncheon Talk." 28 
May 2008. State Summit on Foreclosures and Housing Solutions. National Governors Association. 
Web: http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0806POVERTYRIVLIN.PDF. 14 Apr 2009. 
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preventing problematic loans from being made in the first place; and (3) forming state task 
forces that can convene all the major stakeholders to develop comprehensive solutions.5  
 The focus of this report then lies in finding legislative advancements and solutions 
in state mortgage lending practices. According to Table 1, New York State has thus far 
shown to be one of the most aggressive states in mortgage lending reform despite having 
23,252 foreclosures compared to California’s 151,917 or Florida’s 139,296 (since January, 
2009)(see also Figure 1 and 2).6 Recent observations made by the Wall Street Journal and a 
blogger show that 
somehow, Texas has 
managed to dodge the 
effects of the housing crisis 
despite its location among 
the Sunbelt States.7 Much of 
this avoidance is associated 
with the strictness of the 
                                                      
5 Urahn, Sue and Shelley Hearne. "Defaulting on the Dream: States Respond to America's Foreclosure 
Crisis." The Pew Charitable Trusts Apr 2008 Web.05 Apr 2009. 
<http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Subprime_mortgages/defaulting_o
n_the_dream.pdf>. 
6 These numbers are based on the annualized rate of foreclosure starts reported in the 3Q 2008 MBA 
National Delinquency Survey, adjusted to reflect the entire mortgage market (the MBA survey covers 
80%). Foreclosure starts from 2007-2008 more than doubled from those in 2005-2006. For the entire 
nation, foreclosures in 2009 are expected to reach 2.4 million. This epidemic of home losses has a 
devastating impact on working families, and by depressing the housing market and increasing 
unemployment, also weakens the entire economy.  
"New Foreclosures By State for 2009." Mortgage Lending. 04 Feb 2009. Center for Responsible 
Lending. 30 Apr 2009 <http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/quick-references/new-
foreclosures-by-state.html>. 
7 Timiraos. Nick. "Why Didn’t the Housing Bubble Mess With Texas?," The Wall Street Journal 30 Apr 
2009. Web.30 Apr 2009. <http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2009/04/30/why-didnt-the-housing-
bubble-mess-with-texas/>. 
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state’s lending laws and taxes, all of which will be later discussed; however, it becomes 
clear that the foreclosure crisis was not entirely inevitable due to the various actions of 
individual states. Thus, making comparisons between states, and particularly New York, as 
well as federal policies and policy recommendations offered by such research organizations 
as the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) and the Pew Charitable Trusts, will aid in 
producing innovative approaches that may eventually be considered by all states alike in 
their responses to the foreclosure crisis. Results are expected to reflect the data in Figure 2, 
where the states experiencing the most foreclosure will have the most innovative and/or 
unfamiliar mortgage lending laws. The following issues in the subprime market will be 
addressed and examined8: 
• Adjustable-rate mortgage, teaser rates and balloon payments 
• Financial institutions that were lax in their lending standards and careless about risk 
management; 
• Predatory loan originators who had incentives to make loans at high rates and get 
borrowers to accept teaser rates that soon went up and made the loan unaffordable. 
The profitably of these actions gave little motivation to question the borrower’s 
ability to repay; because the loan was quickly sold to other parties, the originators 
possessed little risk; 
• Regulatory agencies that failed to protect vulnerable borrows or enforce ordinary 
lending standards (like verifying income); 
                                                      
8 Rivlin, Alice M.. "State and Federal Policy in the Foreclosure Crisis: Notes for Luncheon Talk." 28 
May 2008. State Summit on Foreclosures and Housing Solutions. National Governors Association. 
Web: http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0806POVERTYRIVLIN.PDF. 14 Apr 2009. 
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• Consumers who took on subprime loans without the knowledge of the risks and 
responsibilities. 
 
 
This report takes on a clear consumer perspective and seeks to preserve consumer 
protection for personal, but more political, reasons. That is, despite the “neutrality” 
standards of policy analysis, much of the enacted and pending legislation of the states leans 
towards consumer protection without much room to move in the opposite direction – to 
protect the mortgage brokers, lenders, servicers, creditors, etc. Media has given the national 
perception that the banking and mortgage industries are solely to blame for the crisis, and it 
is consequently unfeasible to produce policy recommendations which may argue for 
industry discretion. This said, the four goals that the ultimate recommendations of this 
report will look to meet include: 
1. Foreclosure avoidance and intervention 
2. High-cost lending prevention 
Figure 2. Breakdown of Highest National Foreclosures by State 
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3. Consumer education 
4. Liability and the preemption of predatory behavior 
 
GOALS 
 The four goals mentioned above can be seen in Table 1, which outlines the various 
legislative provisions that have already been enacted by the states with accordance to the 
goals. A description of these goals follows in order to better narrate the table, a good 
indicator of which states have been the most aggressive in this crisis and which have 
lacked, as well as their priorities. Many of the ideas in framing the goal is derived from the 
2007 The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, fabricated by Congressman 
Barney Frank and the House Financial Services Committee.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
9 Miller, Brad. Mel Watt, and Barney Frank. United States. House Financial Services Committee. The 
Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007). 
Figure 3. States’ Response to Foreclosure Prevention 
Source: Urahn, Sue and Shelley Hearne. "Defaulting on the Dream: States Respond to America's Foreclosure Crisis." The Pew 
Charitable Trusts Apr 2008 Web.05 Apr 2009. 
<http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Subprime_mortgages/defaulting_on_the_dream.pdf>.  
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1. Foreclosure Intervention/Avoidance. Where previously the main causes of 
residential foreclosure in America included job loss, family instability (i.e. divorce), 
illness and the like, the rapid bubbling of foreclosures in today’s housing market has 
largely been due to homeowners’ failure to make their mortgage payments, also 
known as homeowner default, and particularly the weak structure of the mortgage 
loans themselves. And as the anticipated number of families currently possessing a 
subprime loan and who will reach home foreclosure within the next few years 
approaches an astounding 2.2 million, the primary goal in mortgage reform lending 
appropriately becomes intervening and avoiding foreclosure in every way possible. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, most states have yet to establish foreclosure intervention 
and prevention laws though “basic” actions such as setting up counseling efforts have 
become increasingly popular. The goal calls for safer and more accessible 
interventional options for the foreclosure process. Also, it aims to help troubled 
homeowners avoid foreclosure and keep their homes through state legislative acts of 
notification and provision of resources to help search for resolutions with their 
lenders. It also suggests better legal protection against abusive, or “predatory,” 
behavior by loan servicers. Aside from consumer protection, it is also important to 
note that foreclosure preventive actions are necessary in order to prevent such crises 
as the subprime mortgage crisis from reoccurring. 
 
2. High-Cost Lending Prevention. Relative to foreclosure prevention is the goal of 
high-cost lending prevention. Much of this is associated with Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act (1994) and how states may use its authority to supplement the 
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act since much of it outlines the most effective approaches to mortgage lending. This 
goal looks to expand the scope of and enhance consumer protections for “high-cost  
 
loans” under the HOEPA, which regulates very high-cost subprime loans that carry 
high rates or fees, and requires certain disclosures and clamps restrictions on lenders 
of these loans. Sandra Braunstein, director of the Federal Reserve Division of 
Consumer and Community Affairs, provides the definition of higher-priced mortgage 
loans as “consumer-purpose loans secured by a consumer's principal dwelling and 
having an annual percentage rate (APR) that exceeds the average prime offer rate for 
comparable transactions published by the Board by at least 1.5 percentage points for 
first-lien loans, or 3.5 percentage points for subordinate lien loans.”10 States should 
expand upon the act’s provisions and fill in loopholes by creating additional 
provisions, and perhaps extending regulation to most types of loans (which must be 
clearly defined), or to cover a broader range of fees since even new provisions only 
accounts for loans in the highest cost portion of the market. This would prevent 
uneducated consumers – or even opportunistic consumers – from taking on 
individually inappropriate loans, contributing to foreclosure prevention. 
 
3. Consumer Education. While this thesis is consumer-friendly, it is extremely 
important to note that, especially in public policy, it is ineffective to “point fingers”; 
that is, the weight of the crisis cannot simply be put on the mortgage brokers, lenders, 
and other parties whose actions have seemingly caused such turmoil. After all, it must 
                                                      
10 Braunstein, Sandra F.. "Mortgage lending reform." Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.. 
11 Mar 2009. Testimony. 
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be assumed that such participants work in the mortgage industry because of their 
interest for the field, not just the profits. Likewise, consumers have unquestionably 
played an enormous role in the wave of foreclosures. It is equally justifiable that 
consumers must do their due diligence by carrying out their duties as responsible 
citizens and homeowners – keeping track of their mortgage payments and using their 
own judgment on how well they can afford a loan before taking on the enormous 
liability. Thus, the goal of consumer education targets the accountability of both 
parties and consists of enhancing consumer knowledge of the mortgage-lending 
process. This may be established through requirements and high advertisement of 
available homeownership and rental housing counseling options, and making them 
more readily available. Provisions may help to prevent both foreclosure and 
borrowers from entering into contracts that they are unable to commit to. Other 
approaches that states have looked into have been targeting home equity theft and 
foreclosure rescue scams, though heavier regulation of these belong in the previous 
category. 
 
4. Liability/Preempt Predatory Behavior. Despite the United States’ vigorous 
attempts to push for strong mortgage lending reform laws at both the state and federal 
levels, compared to the rest of the world American legislation is seemingly still 
extremely weak in this area.11 Particularly with regard to underwriting standards, 
regulations in the subprime market have become extremely loose in recent years, 
tying broker and lender actions to weaving their way through the laws in order to 
                                                      
11 Albrechtsen, Janet. "Not Everyone Should Own a Home," The Wall Street Journal 06 Oct 2008. 
Web.16 Apr 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122325772150706655.html>. 
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avoid liabilities, seek more profitable opportunities and participate in predatory 
lending. Therefore, this is yet another reason why states have been at the forefront of 
consumer protection. Attaching liability and preempting predatory behavior is an 
important goal to meet; it provides remedies for consumers by prescribing regulations 
that prohibit mortgage originators from “steering” any consumer to a loan where he 
lacks a reasonable ability to repay, it does not provide a tangible benefit in the case of 
refinancing, or it has predatory characteristics. It also prohibits steering any consumer 
from a prime loan to a subprime loan, and from engaging in abusive or unfair lending 
practices that promote disparities among consumers without being held fully 
accountable for their actions. This goal also targets the liability of other parties – 
creditors, assignees, securitizers – who knowingly act to take on the lenders’ risk but 
attempt to share the liability with innocent interested parties (i.e. investors). Because 
of other such side transactions with mortgages such as securitization, reformed laws 
have begun to distribute responsibility to these secondary parties who gain 
enormously from the transfer of risk. If they cannot be held liable, action should be 
taken to limit the exploitation of borrowers and that seem predatory. A clear 
definition of “predatory lending” must also be established in order for such goals to 
be fully achieved. 
 
METHODS 
The idea for Table 1 was generated from the need for an updated comparison of 
each individual state’s actions relative to mortgage lending; the most that was available was 
the Pew Charitable Trust’s data from their article, “Defaulting on the Dream,” published in 
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April, 2008.12 The data was collected and put together from examining each individual 
state legislature’s website, reading through the mortgage lending bills that had been passed 
and the different provisions they called for, and developing different categories under 
which each mortgage lending provision (i.e. “Ability to Repay”/”Net Tangible Benefits” 
Analysis; Borrower’s Income Verification) fit under, thus producing the four goals. Table 1 
is the result of the data inputted into Microsoft Excel and the provisions found among 
reading the mortgage lending bills are described in a narrative afterwards, as well as a brief 
summary of the goals. 
 
FINDINGS 
Table 1 thus becomes the basis for this report. As previously stated, it is a helpful 
guide in highlighting which of the fifty states have been most active in the mortgage 
lending market when looking horizontally across the spreadsheet. These include California, 
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania, with California and New York clearly in the lead. On the other 
hand, states such as Alabama, Kansas, and Wyoming have relied on federal laws rather 
than utilize their own state legislatures to maintain the integrity of their mortgage 
industries. However, as expected, these results make sense since they reflect the data 
shown in Figure 2. Though California and Florida apparently dominate the foreclosure 
market, proportions must also be kept in mind; while states such as Maryland and Virginia 
seem to be experiencing significantly lower foreclosures in the chart (located much further 
                                                      
12 Urahn, Sue and Shelley Hearne. "Defaulting on the Dream: States Respond to America's Foreclosure 
Crisis." The Pew Charitable Trusts Apr 2008 Web.05 Apr 2009. 
<http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Subprime_mortgages/defaulting_o
n_the_dream.pdf>. 
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right), the total number of homes owned within these states are just as small in number, 
thus Maryland and Virginia are just as highly affected by the crisis as states reaching above 
20,000 foreclosures. 
Once it is made clear which states have taken the most action, the types of action 
they have may then be distinguished. Overall, most states seem to take priority in reaching 
the goal of consumer education by establishing websites and hotlines to make counseling 
more accessible. Multimedia campaigning efforts seem to parallel these trends. These 
efforts specifically consist of making homeownership and rental housing counseling 
resources more accessible by providing free directorial aids as websites and a national toll-
free hotline (Websites/Hotline Establishment); and requiring the launch of a national public 
service, multimedia campaign to promote homeownership and rental housing counseling 
along with the existence of HUD-certified state, local and nonprofit counseling 
organizations and other programs (Multimedia Campaigning). The high frequency of these 
consumer education provisions across the states may be attributed to the ease and low-cost 
of these establishments. As previously stated, state and local governments carry much of 
the financial burden of such crises and excessive government funding is needed in order to 
produce such effective mortgage lending laws. Due to the high accessibility and low 
expenses of technology usage, educating consumers through this approach seems to be the 
most efficient (getting the most output for a given input13); it expands greatly upon 
consumers’ resources in a cheap and universally convenient manner. 
The mortgage lending laws which seem to be only prevalent among the high 
participating states include the prohibition of excessive fees, refinance programs, and 
                                                      
13 Stone, Deborah. Policy Paradox: The Art of Policy Decision Making. Revised Ed. New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2002. Print. 
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acting within the borrowers’ interests. Oppositely from the establishment of websites, 
hotlines and multimedia campaigning, these state legislative laws are much more difficult 
to come by though proven to be very effective, thus explaining their rarity in Table 1. 
Creating refinance programs are not easily instituted due to states’ limited funding from the 
federal government, though they have been highly successful in many states. Figure 4 
exhibits the colossal amounts of money committed to the individual states with effective 
refinance programs. These programs look to facilitate the option for troubled homeowners 
who are involved in high-cost and adjustable-rate loans to refinance to loans that are 
particularly less-burdensome: 30- or 40-year fixed-rate, fully amortized loans; below-
market rate fixed-rate loans; income-limit loans. Funding for these programs also present 
Figure 4. The State of Loan Funds. 
Source: Urahn, Sue and Shelley Hearne. "Defaulting on the Dream: States Respond to America's Foreclosure Crisis." The 
Pew Charitable Trusts Apr 2008 Web.05 Apr 2009. 
<http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Subprime_mortgages/defaulting_on_the_dream.pdf>. 
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troubled homeowners with the capital for short-term loans (to bring payments up to date), 
emergency loans with a cap (to pay past due or future mortgage payments), or the 
purchasing of borrowers’ loans by agencies.  
The problem with refinance programs lies in the fact that there is simply not enough 
capital to establish these as legislative programs. New Jersey has been one of the few states 
to look into making this a legislative process; however, because they are so costly they 
have only been economically efficient in the states that have needed it most. Martin Eakes, 
the CEO of Self-Help Credit Union in Durham NC and the Center for Responsible 
Lending, claims that homeowners involved in these types of programs are reliable in these 
situations. He exclaims complete confidence that borrowers will pay that money back due 
to his union’s high levels of success and blames the lender, who typically has substantial 
losses and thus distributed product was [unsurvivable].14 Following the path of New Jersey, 
setting up legislative refinance programs are definitely an option to be considered by the 
states though may not feasibly be possible due to economic factors. 
Provisions regulating mortgage brokers and lenders from charging excessive fees 
and acting in the borrowers’ best interests are difficult to present due to lack of predatory 
lending laws. These bills are arduous to enact across the states because they control the 
actions of the lenders themselves, which heavily decrease profitability in the industry 
though pursue goals of liability and high-cost lending prevention. Laws prohibiting 
excessive fees are aimed at such services as payoff information, loan modifications, or late 
payments, where the ability of the borrower to find working resolutions to avoid 
                                                      
14 Eakes, Martin. Martin Eakes on the Subprime Meltdown. Perf. Flash 8 Online Video Interview. The 
Center for Responsible Lending, 2009. Film. < 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/martin-eakes-video-on.html> 
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foreclosure must be maintained. However, such regulations are becoming increasingly 
popular are the crisis exacerbates and drags on. 
Finally, loan modification provisions are clearly one of the most neglected 
legislations among Table 1 however have become the objective of many experts in the field 
as the most necessary reform. Loan modification includes developing systematic 
approaches to allowing high-cost loan borrowers to add past due amounts to the principal 
balance, extend the term of the loan, or reduce interest rate to avoid foreclosure early in the 
foreclosure process with more rapid solutions. California, Michigan and Pennsylvania are 
shown to have forms of loan modification; however, these are minor efforts compared to 
what the literature recommends. For example, the California Foreclosure Prevention Act of 
2009 only seeks to provide additional time (90 days) for borrowers to work out loan 
modifications while providing an exemption for mortgage loan servicers that have 
implemented a comprehensive loan modification program.15 Section 2923.53 also 
recognizes the importance of these programs; however, these do not come close to the 
specific provisions such as reducing tax burdens related to loan modifications that 
undermine foreclosure prevention, which get directly to the heart of the issue. 
The Center for Responsible Lending also recommends reducing or eliminating the 
key obstacles to constructive loan modification. Currently, securitized loans are subject to 
pooling and servicing agreements that present legal barriers to voluntary loan modifications 
needed to avoid foreclosures.  Under this bill, investors must allow servicers to make 
economically-rational loan modifications in order for investment trusts to keep their 
                                                      
15 California Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2009. AB 7. Chapter 5. SEC. 3. Section 2923.52 
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favorable tax status ("REMIC" status). It would also permit loan sales out of trusts.16 Such 
mortgage reform laws would be incredibly beneficial to the mortgage industry because they 
would significantly enhance the private sector's willingness and capability to restructure 
thousands of mortgages that would otherwise fail. Consequently, people would be kept in 
their homes with manageable loans and widespread economic damage from this crisis 
would be widely mitigated. 
Currently, New Jersey is one of the only states to require pre-loan counseling rather 
than foreclosure counseling in order to prevent borrowers from taking on inappropriate 
loans in the first place.17 While there is legislation for foreclosure notices, there should be a 
notice to the borrower prior to obtaining the loan to prevent predatory lending: Notice to 
borrower’s of high-cost loans, where a creditor is unable to make a high-cost home loan 
unless the creditor has given a notice to the borrower acknowledging in writing and signed 
by the borrow, the borrower’s ability to obtain a loan at a lower cost and a brief description 
of the risks and obligations involved in taking on such a loan. New York only recommends 
counseling prior to foreclosure; however, in order to further prevent predatory lending, 
New Jersey has passed laws requiring pre-loan counseling that has been approved by the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Banking and 
Insurance: 
“A creditor shall not make a high-cost home loan to a borrower who 
finances points and fees in connection with [a] the high-cost home loan 
[without first receiving certification from a third-party nonprofit credit 
counselor, approved by the United States Department of Housing and 
                                                      
16 "Top Policies for Addressing the Foreclosure Crisis." Solutions to the Foreclosure Crisis. 25 Mar 
2009. The Center for Responsible Lending. 2 Apr 2009 
<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/solutions/solutions-to-the-foreclosure-
crisis.html#Reduce >. 
17 O’Toole, Kevin and Barbara Buono. State of New Jersey. Senate No. 1619. 213th Legislature. 05 May 
2008.  
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Urban Development and the Department of Banking and Insurance, that the 
borrower has received counseling on the advisability of the loan transaction 
or completing another substantial requirement developed by the 
department].” State of New Jersey, S1619. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Of the existing state legislative laws regarding mortgage lending reform, there are 
two areas which all states must begin to focus on as the foreclosure crisis worsens and the 
spillover effects spread throughout the nation: 
1. Pre-loan counseling to address the goals of high-cost lending prevention and 
consumer education; 
2. Loan modification to facilitate consumer-solutions to subprime mortgages and to 
prevent the failure of thousands of mortgages, addressing the goals of foreclosure 
prevention. 
Many actions have begun to take place within the federal government; however, it is 
equally important for states to begin to take on larger roles in the mortgage lending reform 
movement. While the subprime market was intended to provide homeownership 
opportunities for people with poor or impaired credit histories, it has become an enormous 
part of home financing thus any negative effects must be mitigated to the fullest extent. 
Despite many of the successes of the states’ legislative efforts, multiple generations of 
subprime lending abuses are projected to emerge since its beginnings in 2004. The 
mending process must be a slow and cautious one, and so while many domestic consumers 
and countries abroad alike may disagree with the efforts of the United States government, 
the most effective ways to ease the alleviation process is to ensure that all states are on the 
same legislative pages.
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DATA 
Table 1. Enacted Mortgage Lending Reform Policies by State and Goals. 
a. Foreclosure Avoidance / Intervention 
 
State
"Ability to 
Repay"/Net 
Tangible 
Benefits 
Analysis
Borrower's 
Income 
Verification
Mandatory 
Settlement 
Conference
Foreclosure 
Notice
Refinance 
Programs
Loan 
Modification
Statewide 
Task Force
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona     
Arkansas
California      
Colorado    
Connecticut     
Delaware    
District of Columbia   
Florida    
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois     
Indiana  
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine   
Maryland   
Massachussetts    
Michigan        
Minnesota    
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey    
New Mexico  
New York     
North Carolina   
Foreclosure Avoidance / Intervention
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b. High Cost Lending Prevention; Consumer Education 
 
State
"Ability to 
Repay"/Net 
Tangible 
Benefits 
Analysis
Borrower's 
Income 
Verification
Mandatory 
Settlement 
Conference
Foreclosure 
Notice
Refinance 
Programs
Loan 
Modification
Statewide 
Task Force
North Dakota
Ohio     
Oklahoma
Oregon  
Pennsylvania     
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas    
Utah
Vermont   
Virginia  
Washington  
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Foreclosure Avoidance / Intervention
State
Prohibit Excessive 
Fees
Curb Mortgage Fraud / 
Rescue Scams
Website / 
Hotline 
Establishment
Multimedia 
Campaigning
Alabama
Alaska   
Arizona    
Arkansas
California   
Colorado     
Connecticut
Delaware   
High Cost Lending Prevention Consumer Education
Leann Lu 
000836106 
20 
 
 
State
Prohibit Excessive 
Fees
Curb Mortgage Fraud / 
Rescue Scams
Website / 
Hotline 
Establishment
Multimedia 
Campaigning
District of Columbia  
Florida     
Georgia    
Hawaii  
Idaho    
Illinois     
Indiana    
Iowa    
Kansas
Kentucky    
Louisiana   
Maine    
Maryland    
Massachussetts   
Michigan     
Minnesota   
Mississippi   
Missouri    
Montana   
Nebraska    
Nevada    
New Hampshire  
New Jersey  
New Mexico   
New York     
North Carolina    
North Dakota
Ohio    
Oklahoma   
Oregon    
Pennsylvania   
Rhode Island    
South Carolina   
South Dakota   
Tennessee   
Texas   
Utah  
Vermont   
Virginia    
Washington    
West Virginia
Wisconsin   
High Cost Lending Prevention Consumer Education
Leann Lu 
000836106 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Liability / Preempt Predatory Behavior 
 
State
Prohibit Excessive 
Fees
Curb Mortgage Fraud / 
Rescue Scams
Website / 
Hotline 
Establishment
Multimedia 
Campaigning
South Carolina   
South Dakota   
Tennessee   
Texas   
Utah  
Vermont   
Virginia    
Washington    
West Virginia
Wisconsin   
Wyoming
High Cost Lending Prevention Consumer Education
State
Servicer 
Registration
Creditor / 
Assignee / 
Securitizer 
Liability
Limit / Ban 
Prepayment 
Penalties
Ban 
Mandatory 
Arbitration
Act in 
Borrower's 
Interest
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona    
Arkansas  
California    
Colorado   
Connecticut   
Delaware
District of Columbia  
Florida
Liability/Preempt Predatory Behavior
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State
Servicer 
Registration
Creditor / 
Assignee / 
Securitizer 
Liability
Limit / Ban 
Prepayment 
Penalties
Ban 
Mandatory 
Arbitration
Act in 
Borrower's 
Interest
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois  
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky  
Louisiana
Maine      
Maryland  
Massachussetts  
Michigan    
Minnesota   
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey    
New Mexico
New York     
North Carolina   
North Dakota
Ohio  
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island  
South Carolina  
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont  
Virginia
Washington  
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Liability/Preempt Predatory Behavior
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State
Servicer 
Registration
Creditor / 
Assignee / 
Securitizer 
Liability
Limit / Ban 
Prepayment 
Penalties
Ban 
Mandatory 
Arbitration
Act in 
Borrower's 
Interest
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island  
South Carolina  
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont  
Virginia
Washington  
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Liability/Preempt Predatory Behavior
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MORTGAGE LENDING REFORM GOALS & DESCRIPTION OF PROVISIONS (NARRATIVE TO 
TABLE 1) 
 
Goal (Foreclosure Intervention/Avoidance): to help troubled homeowners avoid 
foreclosure and keep their homes by notification and providing them with resources to help 
find resolutions with their lenders; safer and more accessible interventional options for the 
process; and better legal protection against abusive behavior. Also, to prevent such crises as 
the subprime mortgage crisis from reoccurring.  
• "Ability to Repay"/Net Tangible Benefits Analysis 
o A provision establishing the minimum standard for all mortgages, using tests and 
analyses to determine: 
1. that the consumer has “reasonable ability to repay” a loan, particularly after 
introductory interest rates expire. These tests utilize such financial factors 
as the fully indexed, fully amortized rate of the loan; verified and 
documented information on the consumer’s credit history; current/expected 
income; debt-to-income ratio; and related costs (i.e. property taxes, 
insurance). This analysis may be applicable to all home loans rather than 
solely subprime or other specified loans. 
2. that the loan will provide a net tangible benefit to the consumer. These 
analyses utilize information known or obtained in good faith by the creditor. 
“Net tangible benefits” should be defined. 
• Borrower's Income Verification 
o A provision requiring that lenders must verify, rather than simply state, that a 
borrower’s income is adequate to repay a loan. This may include verification of its 
sources and that the income is not inflated, and necessitates minimum documentation 
for proof. 
• Mandatory Settlement Conference 
o A provision that requires a court in a residential foreclosure action to schedule a 
settlement conference with the parties to a foreclosure action within a set period of 
time (i.e. 60 days) of when the plaintiff files a proof of service of the complaint. The 
court may appoint an attorney if the borrower cannot afford one. 
• Foreclosure Notice 
o A notice, delivered with the summons and complaint, which advises borrowers to 
consult an attorney, local legal aid office or other resources for information about 
possible options to resolve the foreclosure risk, including working with the lender. It 
may notify about organizations which provide assistance, and may warn about 
foreclosure prevention scams. 
• Refinance Programs 
o A provision establishing programs which facilitate the option for troubled 
homeowners who are involved in high-cost loans to refinance to loans that are 
particularly less-burdensome, including fixed rate loans; 30- or 40-year fixed-rate, 
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fully amortized loans; or below-market rate fixed-rate loans; perhaps with income 
limits. Funding for these programs could be provided to also offer troubled 
homeowners short-term loans (to bring payments up to date), emergency loans with 
a cap (to pay past due or future mortgage payments), or the purchasing of borrowers’ 
loans by agencies. 
• Loan Modification 
o A provision that develops a systematic approach to allow high-cost loan borrowers 
to add past due amounts to the principal balance, extend the term of the loan, or 
reduce interest rate to avoid foreclosure early in the foreclosure process with more 
rapid solutions.  
• Statewide Task Force 
o An effort to create foreclosure task forces to address the challenges of the mortgage 
crisis comprehensively, both specific to states and specific to the interests of 
stakeholders. These include government leaders, lenders, advocates and experts, who 
will congregate to work on solutions. 
 
Goal (High Cost Lending Prevention/Supplement HOEPA): to expand the scope of and 
enhance consumer protections for “high-cost loans” under the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act, which regulates very high-cost subprime loans that carry high 
rates or fees, and requires certain disclosures and clamps restrictions on lenders of 
these loans. States should expand upon the act’s provisions and fill in loopholes by 
creating additional provisions, and perhaps extending regulation to most types of 
loans (which must be clearly defined), or to cover a broader range of fees since even 
new provisions only accounts for loans in the highest cost portion of the market. 
• Prohibit Excessive Fees 
o A provision that prohibits lenders from charging borrowers excessive fees for such 
services as payoff information, loan modifications, or late payments. 
• Curb Mortgage Fraud / Rescue Scams 
o A provision that targets foreclosure rescue scams operated by those who seek to take 
advantage of homeowners in default. It may prohibit such actions as performing 
services for the homeowner without a written contract and charging or accepting fees 
without first completing the service. It may exempt regulated entities. It also defines 
and criminalizes the act of mortgage fraud and facilitates the prosecution of these 
cases with more serious offenses. 
 
Goal (Consumer Education): to enhance consumer knowledge of the mortgage-lending 
process through requirements and high advertisement of available homeownership and rental 
housing counseling options, and making them more readily available. Provisions may help 
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to prevent both foreclosure and borrowers from entering into contracts that they are unable 
to commit to.  
• Website/Hotline Establishment 
o A provision making homeownership and rental housing counseling resources more 
accessible by providing free directorial aids as websites and a national toll-free 
hotline. 
• Multimedia Campaigning 
o A provision requiring the launch of a national public service, multimedia campaign 
to promote homeownership and rental housing counseling and the existence of HUD-
certified state, local and nonprofit counseling organizations and other programs. 
 
Goal (Liability/Preempt Predatory Behavior): to provide remedies for consumers and 
preempt predatory behavior by prescribing regulations that prohibit mortgage originators 
from steering any consumer to a loan where he lacks a reasonable ability to repay, it does not 
provide a tangible benefit in the case of refinancing, or it has predatory characteristics; from 
steering any consumer from a prime loan to a subprime loan; and from engaging in abusive 
or unfair lending practices that promote disparities among consumers without being held 
fully accountable for their actions. This goal also targets the liability of other parties – 
creditors, assignees, securitizers – who knowingly act to take on the lenders’ risk but attempt 
to share the liability with innocent interested parties (i.e. investors). If they cannot be held 
liable, actions should be taken to limit actions which take advantage of borrowers and seem 
predatory. Clarify “predatory lending.” 
• Servicer Registration 
o A provision that promotes stricter oversight and enforcement of how mortgages are 
made and sold by requiring that mortgage originators to be licensed, much like 
securities brokers, to engage in the business of mortgage loaning servicing. They may 
be registered in a national registration system or similar database, and must meet 
minimum established education and certification standards. 
• Creditor / Assignee / Securitizer Liability 
o A provision that holds the creditor, assignee, and/or securitizer liable to the consumer 
for violating either the “ability to repay”/net tangible benefits standards, or the bill’s 
standards. They may take on such sanctions as being liable for rescission and taking 
on the costs of rescission (including attorney’s fees), or providing a “cure” – no-cost 
modification for refinancing of the loan – within a specified time period (i.e. 90 days) 
after receiving notice from the consumer.  
• Limit/Ban Prepayment Penalties 
o A provision to limit or ban mortgage originators’ ability to charge fees to borrowers 
for paying off or refinancing a loan early since they are most prevalent in subprime 
loans and take away from equity. 
• Ban Mandatory Arbitration 
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o A provision that ensures borrowers can pursue legal claims through courts without 
having to predetermine liability for damages through a costly arbitration process. 
• Act in Borrower's Interest 
o A provision that may tighten broker duties by establishing an obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing. Brokers must act in borrowers’ best interests by selling only 
mortgages that are appropriate for the particular borrower and disclose any 
compensation clearly and completely, among other good faith actions. 
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